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COMMENT/ Corporate Indemnification of Directors
and Officers-The Expanding Scope of the Statutes
The extension of corporate directors' and officers' personal liability has recently
prompted several states to enact more comprehensive provisions for their
indemnification.I In an attempt to attract corporations, the legislatures of
these states have given corporations greater freedom and their officials greater
protection, far more than most statutes had previously provided. This new
type of statute represents a real departure from the basic indemnity provision
which has been and still is effective, with some variance in language, in many
states. These recent developments come at a time when indemnification is being
viewed more carefully by corporations and their executives.2
The modern corporation demands the very best in manpower throughout its
entire corporate structure. This is especally true of top managerial personnel,
the directors and officers who must harness and direct the corporation's often
far-reaching enterprises. Today many corporate directors serve without com-
pensation other than, perhaps, director's fees, which are usually nominal.
Furthermore, they often have only small financial interests in their corporations.3
An executive in a corporation assumes certain risks; for instance, the law
will not allow a director to treat his position as one of mere honor but will hold
him liable when he fails to exercise due care, prudence and diligence.4 The
1. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 145 (CT Corp. ed. 1967); IowA CODE ANN.
§ 496A. 146 (Supp. 1968); Ch. 99, § 1, [1968] Sess. L. of Kan. 203 (effective on
publication of statute book); La. Reg. Sess. H.B. 362, Ch. 1, § 83 [1968] CCH La.
ADVANCE SESS. L. REP. 362) (effective July 31, 1968); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 410
(Purdon Supp. 1968); VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-3.1 (Supp. 1968).
2. Following an allegation by the Securities and Exchange Commission that Merrill
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith and other security brokers had violated rules on dis-
semination of inside information, a staff reporter of the Wall Street Journal wrote that:
[a] lot of executives are scared stiff these days....
According to Harold Frederick, a vice-president of Stewart, Smith, a Chicago
insurance agency that represents Lloyds of London, sales of executive insurance
"were practically nonexistent a few years ago, but recently there has been a
tremendous growth."...
Insurance men and executives agree that companies and their top officials
are increasingly worried that they may be sued at any time for activities arising
out of what seem to be normal business dealings.
Carley, Insuring Executives, The Wall Street Journal, Aug. 29, 1968, at 1, col. 1.
3. See I MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. § 4(o), 114.02 (1960).
4. See, e.g., Briggs v. Spaulding, 141 U.S. 132 (1891); Brown v. Bullock, 294 F.2d
415 (2d Cir. 1961); Helfman v. American Light & Traction Co., 121 N.J. Eq. 1,
187 A. 540 (1936); Hun v. Cary, 82 N.Y. 65 (1880); but see Bishop, Sitting Ducks
and Decoy Ducks: New Trends in the Indemnification of Corporate Directors and
Officers, 77 YALE L.J. 1078, 1095 (1968), where it is argued that "the cases usually
cited as examples of director's liability for negligence fall into a special category not at
all typical of modern American corporate life." The author further states that the
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corporate official is vulnerable to stockholder derivative suits and third party
actions such as antitrust (criminal or civil), securities fraud, income tax and
libel. For example, a private individual can bring a tort action for treble
damages under Section 4 of the Clayton Act 5 for pecuniary loss to his business
or property resulting from corporate conspiracy, and the corporate executive
is personally liable if he has participated in the corporate wrongdoing, whether
or not he was acting within the scope of his authority. 6 Furthermore, in
a criminal prosecution for conduct contravening the antitrust laws it is no
defense that the executive lacked specific intent to violate the statute,7 or that
in good faith he did not believe he was violating the law.8 Section 14 of the
Clayton Act 9 authorizes the imposition of a fine not exceeding $5000 upon
the corporate executive for acts which render his corporation criminally liable.
Since the position of a corporate executive is so prestigious, such risks might
at first be discounted by an aspirant to corporate "officialdom"; however, the
risks which the corporate director and officer face are increasing. 10 Whether
this is due to higher standards of conduct required by federal and state statutes
and administrative rulings1l or to an increase in the number of shareholders
resulting in an increase in derivative actions is a question beyond the scope
of this Comment. There have recently been some well-publicized suits and
threatened suits against corporate officials.12 To those who must solicit qualified
people to serve as directors and officers of a corporation, the substance of
indemnification laws has thus become an important factor when choosing a
state for incorporation.
In addition to holding corporate officials liable for failure to diligently
"modern cases which fit into the general category are comparatively few and involve
monied corporations other than banks-frequently, investment companies." Id. at 1099.
See also Booth v. Dexter Steam Fire-Eng. Co., 118 Ala. 369, 24 So. 405 (1898);
Mutual Bldg. Fund & Dollar Say. Bank v. Bosseiux, 3 F. 817 (E.D. Va. 1880).
5. 38 Stat. 731 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1964) ; see Northwestern Oil Co. v. Socony-
Vacuum Oil Co., 138 F.2d 967 (7th Cir. 1943).
6. See, e.g., Lahr v. Adell Chem. Co., 300 F.2d 256 (1st Cir. 1962).
7. United States v. Griffith, 334 U.S. 100, 105 (1948).
8. American Amusement Co. v. Ludwig, 82 F. Supp. 265, 267 (D. Minn. 1949).
9. 38 Stat. 736 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 24 (1964).
10. See Whiting, Antitrust and the Corporate Executive, 47 VA. L. REV. 929, 938
(1961), where it is noted that during the 1950's, the Justice Department indicted 431
corporate officials for alleged violations of the Sherman or Clayton Acts.
11. Congress enacted Section 4 of the Clayton Act to encourage private suits for
antitrust violations, hoping that the lure of treble damages would assist and supplement
the federal government in enforcing the antitrust laws. See United States v. Borden Co.,
347 U.S. 514, 518 (1954); Monarch Life Ins. Co. v. Loyal Protective Life Ins. Co.,
326 F.2d 841, 846 (2d Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 952 (1964).
12. See, e.g., Sylvia Martin Foundation, Inc. v. Swearingen, 260 F. Supp. 231
(S.D.N.Y. 1966); Smith, The Incredible Electrical Conspiracy, FORTUNE, April 1961,
at 132, where it is reported that officials of 44 corporations, adjudged guilty of con-
spiring to restrain trade, were given jail sentences and, in addition, were fined $100,000.
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perform the duties of their office, courts have long held that a corporate
director or officer is presumed to know everything that he could have learned
by the exercise of reasonable care and diligence and that he is liable for failure
to investigate that which he should have investigated. 13 Perhaps to implement
the policy of these holdings, there also developed a general rule that reim-
bursement for defense expenses incurred would not be allowed to a director or
officer found derelict in the performance of his duties;14 in the case of a success-
ful defense, there was a split of authority on the right to such reimbursement.I s
Corporations often attempted to protect their officials through a joint defense
of the corporation and its officials by the corporation's legal counsel, but this
method provided no assistance to directors and officers assessed with fines,
liabilities or settlements. Some corporations provided for directors-officers'
indemnification in their articles of incorporation or bylaws without state
statutory authorization.1 6
In 1939 the landmark case of New rork Dock Company v. McCollum
held that a corporation had no power to reimburse corporate officials for the
expense of successfully defending a derivative action, absent a showing of
benefit to the corporation. 18 This decision triggered a legislative reaction to
negate such a holding. The first state to act was New York in 1941,19 and
today 44 states and the District of Columbia have explicit provisions governing
the indemnification of directors and officers. Some of these indemnification
provisions are permissive, i.e., they allow a corporation to indemnify a director
or officer under certain conditions. Others provide for mandatory indemnifica-
13. Michelsen v. Penney, 135 F.2d 409 (2d Cir. 1943). See also Escott v. BarCris
Constr. Co., 283 F. Supp. 643 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
14. E.g., Hollander v. Breeze Corp., 131 N.J. Eq. 585, 26 A.2d 507 (1941), aff'd
per curiam, 131 N.J. Eq. 613, 26 A.2d 522 (Ct. Err. & App. 1942). A recent case
handed down by the Minnesota Supreme Court held that under the Minnesota in-
demnification statute and the corporation's bylaws, both of which are merely per-
missive, the directors were not entitled to indemnification as a matter of right and the
corporation's refusal to indemnify was justified, particularly since the directors were
not vindicated of all the charges brought against them by the Securities and Exchange
Commission. Tomash v. Midwest Tech. Dev. Corp.. ...... Minn ....... , 160 N.W. 2d
273 (1968).
15. See Figge v. Bergenthal, 130 Wis. 594, 109 N.W. 581 (1906); Solimine v. Hol-
lander, 129 N.J. Eq. 264, 19 A.2d 344 (1941); In re E. C. Warner Co., 232 Minn.
207, 45 N.W.2d. 388 (1950). Contra, Griesse v. Lang, 37 Ohio App. 553, 175 N.E. 222
(1931).
16. See 1 MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. § 4(o), V14.01 (1960).
17. 173 Misc. 106, 16 N.Y.S.2d 844 (Sup. Ct. 1939).
18. The court required that for reimbursement to be given, the director must clearly
demonstrate that "he has conserved some substantial interest of the corporation which
otherwise might not have been conserved, or has brought some definite benefit to the
corporation which otherwise might have been missed." Id. at 111, 16 N.Y.S.2d at
849. Contra, Solimine v. Hollander, supra note 15.
19. Law of April 2, 1941, ch. 209 [1941], N.Y. GEN. CORP. LAW § 27-a (McKinney
1943), amended and renumbered N.Y. GEN. CORP. LAW § 63 (McKinney Supp. 1968).
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tion of directors and officers by the corporation where the directors and officers
have been successful in their defense,20 while Wisconsin has both a mandatory
and a permissive provision.21
In 1943 Delaware enacted a provision that has served as a model for many
states. 22 The Delaware statute authorized the corporation to indemnify its
directors and officers, past and present, for actual and necessary expenses in-
curred in the defense of any action to which they are made parties, except
where they are adjudged liable for misconduct or negligence in the performance
of their duties. In effect, corporate officials could only be indemnified for
expenses of a successful defense. In 1960, the Model Business Corporation
Act (hereinafter MBCA) was revised to reflect changes in the Delaware-type
provision which were thought to be necessary. The indemnification laws of
21 states and the District of Columbia 23 remain basically patterned after
these two statutes, especially in respect to their non-applicability where the
director or officer is found guilty of negligence or misconduct in the perform-
ance of his corporate duties. The newer, more explicit coverage afforded by
recent legislative enactments can only be considered and explained in light of
the uncertainty and vagueness which characterized the old Delaware and
MBCA (1960 version) provisions.
20. E.g., Ky. REV. STAT. § 271.375 (1963).
21. Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 180.04(14) (permissive), 108.407 (mandatory) (Supp.
1968).
22. Ch. 125, § 1, [1943] 44 Del. Laws (repealed 1967):
[A corporation is authorized to i]ndemnify any and all of its directors or officers
or former directors or officers or any person who may have served at its re-
quest as a director or officer of another corporation in which it owns shares of
capital stock or of which it is a creditor against expenses actually and necessarily
incurred by them in connection with the defense of any action, suit or pro-
ceeding in which they, or any of them, are made parties, or a party, by
reason of being or having been directors or officers or a director or officer of
the corporation, or of such other corporation, except in relation to matters
as to which any such director or officer or former director or officer or person
shall be adjudged in such action, suit or proceeding to be liable for negligence
or misconduct in the performance of duty. Such indemnification shall not be
deemed exclusive of any other rights to which those indemnified may be en-
titled, under any by-law, agreement, vote of stockholders, or otherwise.
23. ALASKA STAT. § 10.05.009(15) (1962); COLO. REV. STAT. § 31-2-1(15) (1963);
D.C. CODE ANN. § 29-904(p) (1967) ; Act 257, [1965] 1 Sess. Laws of Hawaii 434; IND.
ANN. STAT. § 25-202(10) (Burns Supp. 1968); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 146
(Supp. 1967); Mici. CoMP. LAws ANN. § 450.10(l) (1967); MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 301.09(7) (Supp. 1967); Miss. CODE ANN. § 530 9 -4 (o) (Supp. 1966) ; MONT. REV.
CODESANN.§ 15-2204(o) (1967);NEB. REV. STAT. § 21-103(9) (1962) ; NEV. REV. STAT.
§ 78.070(6) (1967); N.M. STAT. ANN., § 51-24-4(0) (Supp. 1967); N.D. CENT. CODE
ANN. § 10-19-04(15) (1960); ORE. REV. STAT. § 57.030(15) (1967); R. I. GEN. LAWS
ANN. § 7-9-12 (1956); Ch. 22, S.D. Sess. Laws H.B. 893 [1965]; UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 16-10-4(o) (Supp. 1967); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 23. A.08.020(15) (Supp. 1967);
W. VA. CODE ANN. § 31-1-18a (1966); WIs. STAT. ANN. §§ 180.04(14), 180.407 (Supp.
1968); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 17-36.4(o) (1957).
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The indemnification laws of Delaware, Iowa, Kansas, Louisiana, Pennsyl-
vania and Virginia enacted within the past two years have, to a large degree,
a common pattern. In terms of coverage and statutory language, the newer
statutes do not depart radically from those statutes based on the old Delaware
provision. Instead, they distill previous provisions allowing greater freedom
to the corporation and reject those provisions which tend to restrict corporate
discretion. Delaware's new statute will be used as illustrative of the newer
enactments.
A. Persons Covered
The new Delaware statute provides for the indemnification of "a director,
officer, employee or agent of the corporation." 24 Indemnification may also
be made to "a person who has ceased to be a director, officer, employee or
agent and shall inure to the benefit of the heirs, executors and administrators
of such a person. '25 The former Delaware statute provided for the indemnifica-
tion of "directors or officers" but left unclear whether indemnification could be
granted for corporate executive personnel who are not "directors or officers"
under statute, bylaw or articles of incorporation. Wisconsin's mandatory pro-
vision alleviates this problem by specifically providing for coverage of a
"director, officer or employe," 26 although its permissive section does not make
such an inclusion. Connecticut's statute also includes employees as subjects
of indemnification, explicitly defining "employee" to include any person
"engaged to perform service for the corporation, whether as independent con-
tractor or otherwise." 27 Similarly, Ohio's recently enacted provision 28 covers
"employees" as well as directors and officers.
This inclusion of corporate personnel who may not technically qualify as
directors or officers under statute, certificate of incorporation, or bylaw should
prevent the hardship situation where such an individual must face liability
because of acts performed pursuant to his corporate duties. Massachusetts'
statute allows indemnification of directors and officers elected by the stock-
holders where such indemnification is provided for in the articles of organiza-
tion or the bylaws, or by a majority vote of the shareholders. It then authorizes
24. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 145 (a), (b) (CT Corp. ed. 1967). The new Delaware
statute also permits indemnification of one who "is or was serving at the request of the
corporation as a director, officer, employee or agent of another corporation, partner-
ship, joint venture, trust or other enterprise . . . ." Delaware's former provision was
somewhat more restrictive in that it permitted indemnification of "a director or
officer of another corporation in which [the indemnifying corporation] owns shares of
capital stock or of which it is a creditor." Ch. 125, § 1, [1943] 44 Del. Laws (repealed
1967).
25. DEL. CoDE ANN. tit. 8, § 145(f) (CT Corp. ed. 1967).
26. WIs. STAT. ANN. § 180.407 (Supp. 1968).
27. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 33-320(a) (Supp. 1968).
28. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1701.13 (E) (Page Supp. 1967).
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the directors to provide for indemnification of officers "elected by the directors"
but who are not directors, as well as "employees and other agents of a cor-
poration."' 29 The Massachusetts "agent" provision, together with the new
Delaware-type statutes, may extend indemnification to the far corners of the
corporate structure.
The earlier Delaware statute was silent as to whether the estate of a deceased
director or officer could be reimbursed in situations where the director or
officer would have been entitled to indemnification in his lifetime. Other states,
in addition to Delaware, have sought to fill this gap. Montana's former enact-
ment, although not providing indemnification for employees other than direc-
tors and officers, included the "personal representatives" of directors and
officers. 30 South Carolina provides that the "right of indemnity shall inure to
the estate, executor, administrator, heirs, legatees, or devisees of any person en-
titled to indemnification .... ',31 The newer Delaware-type statutes have fol-
lowed Montana and South Carolina in obviating any argument that the right
to indemnification ceases upon the death of the person entitled to be indemni-
fied.
B. Types of Actions Covered
Delaware's new statute permits indemnification in "any threatened, pending
or completed" third party or derivative action. Indemnification in a third party
proceeding covers "civil, criminal, administrative or investigative" actions.32
This description of types of actions covered is far more detailed than Delaware's
former statute, which allowed indemnification for "the defense of any action,
suit or proceeding . . . ."33 The uncertainty as to whether the latter provision
would apply to criminal actions caused the draftsmen of the MBCA (1960
version) to include "any action, suit or proceeding, civil or criminal."'
Other questions left unanswered by the former Delaware statute were:
whether it granted indemnification in a derivative suit as well as a third party
action, and whether it included purely investigatory proceedings, arbitration
proceedings and declaratory judgments.35 North Carolina and Arkansas exclude
29. MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 156B, § 67 (Supp. 1968).
30. Ch. 84, § 1, 1943 Mont. Laws (repealed 1967).
31. S.C. CODE ANN. § 12-18.18(e) (Supp. 1967).
32. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 145(a) (CT Corp. ed. 1967).
33. Ch. 125, § 1, [1943] 44 Del. Laws (repealed 1967).
34. MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 4(o) (1960).
35. Folk, Corporation Statutes: 1959-1966, 1966 DuKE L.J. 875, 904-05, raises a re-
lated problem inherent in such a description of types of action covered as found in the
former Delaware provision. A court, when dealing with complicated litigation involving
cross-claims and counterclaims, might be bound by the "defense" language and have to
allocate legal expenses between the director's dual role as a defendant and a counter
or cross-claimant, with only the former amount being indemnifiable.
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derivative suits from the reach of their indemnification statutes, although they
explicitly provide indemnification in criminal prosecutions and other third
party actions.3 6 Wisconsin and Rhode Island have chosen to specifically in-
clude administrative proceedings within permissible indemnification coverage.37
However, other statutory provisions on types of actions covered are as vague
as Delaware's former provision; for example, Arizona uses the term "legal
action" to describe when indemnification may properly be made.38
For those statutes which do not set out with some specificity the type of
action covered, the decision must be left to a court in a proper case. Massa-
chusetts is an extreme example in that its statute is completely silent as to
the type of proceeding covered by indemnification.3 9 It could be construed
broadly to cover any conceivable proceeding, or narrowly as did the New
York Court of Appeals in interpreting the New York provision allowing in-
demnification in "any action, suit or proceeding. '40 In Schwarz v. General
Aniline & Film Corporation,41 the court held that statute inapplicable to
expenses incurred by an officer or director in a criminal prosecution. The
court stated, "[i]t would be a very strange public policy, indeed, which would
set up legal machinery whereby one charged with, or convicted of, a crime,
of whatever kind, could require the corporation by whom he was employed to
pay his legal expenses." 42 However, the doctrine of Schwarz has been re-
pudiated by statute in New York, and in view of the tendency toward more
inclusive indemnification statutes, it is doubtful that a court would so nar-
rowly limit Massachusetts' provision. The description of types of actions
covered in the newer statutes will certainly avoid a Schwarz result.
C. Settlements and Expenses-Third Party v. Derivative Suits
The new Delaware statute allows indemnification in "any threatened, pending
or completed" third party or derivative action. In third party suits indemnifica-
tion can include "amounts paid in settlement actually and reasonably incurred."
In the case of derivative suits, however, indemnification is limited to expenses
actually and reasonably incurred in the settlement of such an action.43 Dela-
ware's former statute allowed indemnification except in cases of negligence
and misconduct but made no mention of settlements in a threatened or pending
36. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-20 (1965) ; ARK. STAT. ANN. § 64-309 (1966).
37. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 180.04(14) (Supp. 1968); R.I. GEN. LAWs ANN. § 7-9-12
(1956).
38. ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 10-198(B) (Supp. 1967).
39. MASs. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 156B, § 67 (Supp. 1968).
40. N.Y. GEN. CORP. LAW § 64 (McKinney Supp. 1968-69).
41. 305 N.Y. 395, 113 N.E.2d 533 (1953).
42. Id. at 402, 113 N.E.2d at 536.
43. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 145(a), (b) (CT Corp. ed. 1967).
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action.44 In 1960, the MBCA revisers desired coverage of settlement payments
if, for example, the corporation had been advised by counsel that the suit was
without substantial merit and the settlement payment was not in excess of the
probable litigation expenses.45 Thus the MBCA's provision read "expenses
actually and reasonably incurred" 46 in contrast to Delaware's former require-
ment that the expenses be actually and necessarily incurred.
Some statutes have specifically included settlements within their indemni-
fication provisions, while others have specifically excluded them. Minnesota,
for example, excludes "amounts paid pursuant to a judgment or settlement
agreement," and denies indemnification for expenses where the defendant is
"finally" adjudged liable for negligence or misconduct.47 Michigan allows no
indemnification as to "such matters as shall be settled by agreement predicated
on the existence of such liability."48 In contrast, New Mexico permits in-
demnification in connection "with the settlement" of any action,49 and Rhode
Island allows indemnification where there is a "reasonable settlement" of legal
or administrative proceedings. 50 Florida allows indemnification for expenses
in both third party and derivative actions, and expenses can include "judg-
ments, fines, amounts paid in settlement and reasonable expenses, including
attorneys' fees . . . ."51 Possibly from concern that certain expense items of past
litigation which seemed reasonable at the time were not at all necessary, as
well as from concern for settlement payments, other states52 have adopted the
MBCA (1960 version) approach. Wisconsin apparently has tried to take a
middle position by awarding "reasonable expenses, including attorney fees,
actually and necessarily incurred .... ,,53
These statutes failed to recognize, as the new statutes have, that the policy
considerations applicable to third party actions differ from those involved in
derivative actions. Such recognition would have made it easier to establish
when settlements and compromises were properly indemnifiable. It is a well
44. Ch. 125, § 1, [1943] 44 Del. Laws (repealed 1967). In Essential Enterprises Corp.
v. Dorsey Corp., 40 Del. Ch. 343, 182 A.2d 647 (1962), the court noted that the
statute was ambiguous with respect to compromise settlements. It stated that it was
"apparent that were this court concerned only with the statute a question would arise as
to whether the statutory limitations on the right to grant indemnification have any
application to a settlement because of the use of the word 'adjudged' in the statute."
Id. at 350, 182 A.2d at 652. But because of the interpretation and application of the
corporation's bylaw, the court was able to pass over the issue.
45. See I MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. § 4(o), 114.03 (1960).
46. MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 4(o) (1960).
47. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 301.09(7) (Supp. 1967).
48. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 450.10-1 (1967).
49. N. M. STAT. ANN. § 51-24-4(0) (Supp. 1967).
50. R. I. GEN. LAws ANN. § 7-9-12 (1957).
51. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 608.13(15) (Supp. 1968).
52. E.g., IND. ANN. STAT. § 25-202(9) (Burns Supp. 1968); ME. REv. STAT. ANN.
tit. 13, § 146 (Supp. 1967).
53. WIs. STAT. ANN. § 180.407 (Supp. 1968).
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established policy of the law to encourage the settlement of threatened actions
wherever possible and proper. While a corporation might wish to press for
settlement of a claim against one of its officials by an outsider, there is a
different policy involved in a derivative suit where, in effect, the corporation
itself is the plaintiff seeking to establish the liability of the director or officer.
It is in their recognition of this distinction that some statutes have departed
markedly from the former Delaware and MBCA (1960 version) provisions.
The various states have handled this problem differently. New Jersey's
provision apparently covers settlement payments only in third party actions
since it is "exclusive of any amounts paid to the corporation in settlement," and
if the action is settled, then the board of directors must determine that the
director or officer had not been derelict in his corporate duties.54 Texas appears
to allow indemnification in other than finally adjudicated court proceedings by
use of the language "in court or otherwise" but would exclude, like New
Jersey, any amount paid in settlement to the corporation.55
Connecticut allows indemnification for expenses of "any judgment, money
decree, fine, penalty or settlement" which the board of directors deems "rea-
sonable." In the case of derivative actions, that state withholds indemnification
unless the defendant is successful in his defense on the merits or the court
"finds such payment not unreasonable or inequitable .... "56 If a court were
to award indemnification in a derivative suit where the defendant was not
even partially successful on the merits, the very purpose of the derivative
action would seem to be defeated. If a director or officer loses a derivative
suit, he will have to pay damages to the corporation in whose behalf the
suit was brought. Obviously this payment of damages would be meaningless
if the corporation were then permitted to put this money back into the director's
or officer's pocket. It is thus unlikely that any court under a statute such as
Connecticut's would grant an indemnification award in very many settlements
of derivative actions. This provision may, however, be utilized when a court,
for the first time in its jurisdiction, labels certain conduct as constituting a
breach of the director's or officer's duty. Then it would be inequitable to deny
indemnification to a director or officer following conservative advice on a course
of conduct never before held a breach of duty.5 7 The British Companies Act
recognized that such instances may occur where, in fairness, the corporation
should bear the risk of loss.58 The newer statutes, typified by Delaware, also pro-
vide that in derivative suits a person shall not be indemnified where adjudged
.54. N.J. REV. STAT. § 14:3-14 (Supp. 1967).
55. Tax. REV. CIVIL STAT. art. 1396-2.22A (1962).
56. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 33-320(c) (Supp. 1968).
57. See Folk, supra note 35, at 911.
58. 11 & 12 Geo. 6, ch. 38, § 448(1) (1948).
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liable for negligence or misconduct "unless and only to the extent that the [court]
shall determine . . . that, despite the adjudication of liability but in view of
all the circumstances of the case, such person is fairly and reasonably entitled
to indemnity for such expenses which the [court] shall deem proper. '59 Of the
recent statutes, Iowa is the only one which apparently has decided to proscribe
its courts from giving this type of equitable relief.6°
Other states have given boards of directors discretion to indemnify for
settlement of derivative suits. Kentucky's provision apparently applies to
compromise settlements in both situations since it requires that the board of
directors "shall have first approved such proposed compromise settlement and
determined that the director or officer involved was not guilty of actual
negligence or misconduct . "...-61 This latter standard of conduct has been
expressly made applicable to derivative suits in many statutes for purposes of
determining if indemnification shall be granted. Ohio also makes indemnifica-
tion for amounts paid in settlement of any threatened or pending action
dependent upon adjudication or determination by the board that the director
or officer was not guilty of negligence or misconduct. 62 Missouri and Georgia
similarly grant indemnification for third party or derivative action settle-
ments upon the board's determination. 63 This type of provision gives a corpora-
tion great latitude in dealing with settlements in view of the fact that there
is no judicial supervision of the settlement or the indemnification award.
South Carolina permits indemnification for court-approved settlements
where a court finds that the defendant director or officer equitably merits
such indemnityfr4 No distinction is made in the South Carolina statute be-
tween derivative and third party actions. Other states, however, have drawn
such a distinction in regard to settlements with court approval. With respect
to third party actions, North Carolina allows a director or officer, even if
wholly unsuccessful in his defense, to be indemnified for defense expenses and
the amount of the judgment, money decree, fine, penalty or settlement, if the
shareholders approve of such a plan. However, indemnification in a derivative
suit is permitted only if the director or officer is successful in at least part of the
suit and the court finds he equitably merits such indemnity.65 California gives
the court discretion to award indemnification in third party and derivative
suits if the action itself is settled with court approval, but the board of directors
59. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 145(b) (CT Corp. ed. 1967).
60. IOWA CODE ANN. § 496A.146 (Supp. 1968).
61. Ky. REV. STAT. § 271.375(2) (1963).
62. Omo REV. CODE ANN. § 1701.13(E) (Page Supp. 1967).
63. Mo. ANN. STAT. § 351.355 (1966); GA. CODE ANN. § 22-717(d) (Supp. 1968)
(effective April 1, 1969).
64. S.C. CODE ANN. § 12-18.18(b) (1) (B) (Supp. 1966).
65. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 55-20, 55-21 (1965).
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may make the award under certain circumstances in a third party action.66
New York's statute pertaining to derivative actions does not provide indemnifi-
cation for amounts paid in settling or disposing of a threatened action whether
or not there is court approval, but there must be court approval of a settlement
before other defense expenses of a derivative suit can be indemnified;67 New
York does, however, allow indemnification for amounts paid in settlement of
a third party action.68 Tennessee's new indemnification law follows New York
very closely in this respect.69
Massachusetts leaves open the question of whether it allows indemnification
for amounts paid in settlement or compromise or whether there has to be a
"final" adjudication other than to the extent "authorized by (i) the articles of
organization or (ii) a by-law adopted by the stockholders or (iii) a vote
adopted by the holders of a majority of the shares of stock entitled to vote on
the election of directors or such officers."'70 At once it would appear that the
Massachusetts statute opens the floodgates to virtually unlimited indemnifica-
tion, for, by its terms, only broad limits are imposed on the corporation in one
respect and on the directors in another as far as determining just how much
and in what instances indemnification will be proper. Again, the Massachusetts
courts may narrowly construe the provision and eliminate amounts paid in
settlement (at least with regard to derivative actions) on the ground that
to do otherwise would violate public policy or be harmful to the corporation
or its shareholders.
D. Standards for Denying Indemnification-Third Party v. Derivative Suits
In those statutes patterned after the former Delaware statute, indemnification
is denied where the director or officer is found liable for negligence or mis-
conduct in the performance of his corporate duty. This standard is appro-
priate enough for judging the official's action as it relates to his corporate
duty to shareholders and should be the one utilized in a derivative action. But
the standard seems overly strict in its application to the official's conduct
toward outsiders or third parties. Some statutes depart from the old Delaware-
type statute by recognizing policy differences between the standards to be
employed in derivative and third party actions. Accordingly, the new Dela-
ware statute provides for indemnification in civil actions where the director
or officer had acted in good faith and in the reasonable belief he was acting
66. CAL. CORP. CODE ANN. § 830(a), (f) (Supp. 1967).
67. N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAw § 722(1) (McKinney 1963).
68. Id. at § 723(a).
69. Tenn. Reg. Sess. H.B. 551, § 3.08(1) (1968] (CCH TENN. ADVANCE SESS. L.
REP. 430) (effective July 1, 1969).
70. MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 156B, § 67 (Supp. 1968).
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in the interests of his corporation, and in criminal actions where he had no
reason to believe his conduct was unlawful. Indemnification is denied, how-
ever, in derivative actions when the director or officer is found negligent or
guilty of misconduct in the performance of his corporate duties.
Arizona has not made an explicit distinction between third party and
derivative actions and leaves in doubt whether derivative actions come within
its provisions at all, since the language merely allows indemnification to the
director or officer for any actions or omissions while acting "within the scope
of his employment as a director or officer . . . ." The standard of conduct it
employs is of no help in resolving the question. It provides for indemnification
where the director or officer "did not act, fail[s] to act, or refuse[s] to act
wilfully or with gross negligence or with fraudulent or criminal intent .... "
Similarly, the standard expressed in Massachusetts' statute raises one more
unresolved question as to the scope of that statute's coverage. In Massachusetts
no indemnification is provided if the director or officer did not act "in good
faith in the reasonable belief that his action was in the best interests of the
corporation." 72 The application of this provision in a derivative suit would
relieve a director or officer of the stricter standard of conduct, i.e., reasonable
care. This conclusion, of course, assumes that the Massachusetts provision
covers both derivative and third party suits.
Florida employs different standards for derivative and third party actions
similar to those of the new Delaware statute.73 The other recent enactments
follow the Delaware provision, except that Virginia omits the standard with
respect to criminal actions.74 The limitation upon the power to indemnify in
criminal actions found in Delaware and other recent statutes attempts to
avoid undermining the deterrent effect of the criminal law.75 In view of the
myriad federal and state statutes and regulations with which a director or
officer must comply in conducting the affairs of a corporation, it is not un-
reasonable to indemnify a director or officer who has unwittingly broken a law
or regulation. Ohio, which does not explicitly distinguish between derivative
and third party actions, nevertheless employs the three types of standards found
in Florida and the newer provisions.76 Georgia also utilizes the same standards
and adds that indemnification will be provided where the director or officer
in a third party suit had acted in a manner which he believed was "not opposed
to the best interests of the corporation. '7 7 It has been suggested that this kind
71. ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 10-198(B) (Supp. 1967).
72. MASs. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 156B, § 67 (Supp. 1968).
73. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 608.13(14) (15) (Supp. 1966).
74. VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-3.1 (Supp. 1968).
75. See Arsht & Stapleton, Delaware's New General Corporation Law: Substantive
Changes, 23 Bus. LAW. 75, 78 (1967).
76. OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 1701.13(E) (Page Supp. 1967).
77. GA. CoDEANN. § 22-717(a) (Supp. 1968) (effective April 1, 1969).
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of language was intended to cover situations in which the director or officer
did not realize that his corporation had any interest whatever in the particular
course of action he had taken.78
E. Provisions Guarding Against Unfavorable Presumptions
Another means by which the newer enactments give corporate officials greater
protection is through specific provisions guarding against unfavorable presump-
tions. The new Delaware-type provision stipulates that in third party suits
the "termination of any action, suit or proceeding by judgment, order, settle-
ment, conviction, or upon a plea of nolo contendere or its equivalent, shall
not, of itself, create a presumption that the person did not act in good faith and
in a manner which he reasonably believed to be in or not opposed to the best
interests of the corporation, and, with respect to any criminal action or pro-
ceeding, had reasonable cause to believe that his conduct was unlawful." 79
This clause, of course, has no application to derivative actions where, absent
a judicial equitable award, indemnification is denied if the director or officer
is found negligent or guilty of misconduct.
In addition to the newer enactments modeled after Delaware's provision,
Florida, South Carolina, and Tennessee similarly provide against unfavor-
able presumptions arising from an adverse final adjudication.80 The recent
Virginia statute8 l omits the provision against an unfavorable presumption
in a criminal proceeding and thus exposes the corporate executive to the
probable deleterious effect of a conviction or nolo contendere plea on indemni-
fication. Iowa's new statute makes a real departure in providing that the
"termination of any action . . . by judgment or order against such person
on the merits, conviction, or upon a plea of nolo contendere . . . shall, of itself,
create a presumption that the person did not act in good faith ....
(Emphasis added.) While the language excludes settlements from the presump-
tion, nonetheless such a presumption places an unnecessary burden upon the
director or officer who, although adjudged liable to third parties, must now
convincingly show that he was acting in good faith, in the best interests of the
corporation and, with respect to criminal actions, had no reasonable cause to
believe his conduct was unlawful.
78. Arsht and Stapleton, supra note 75, at 78.
79. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 145(a) (CT Corp. ed. 1967).
80. FLA. STAT. ANN. §608.13(15) (Supp. 1966); Tenn. Reg. Sess. H.B. 551,
§ 3.08(2) [1968] (CCH TENN. ADVANCE SEss. L. REP. 430-31) (effective July 1, 1969).
81. VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-3.1 (Supp. 1968).
82. IowA CODE ANN. § 496A.146(1) (Supp. 1968).
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F. Non-Exclusivity of the Statutes
The newer statutes are also non-exclusive in their operation. For example,
Delaware provides that indemnification "shall not be deemed exclusive of
any other rights to which those indemnified may be entitled under any by-law,
agreement, vote of stockholders or distinterested directors or otherwise . *."..83
Both Delaware's former provision and the MBCA (1960 version) contained
similar language, although the MBCA omitted the "or otherwise" clause.8 4
These provisions afford to corporations a maximum amount of discretion and
could conceivably defeat the purpose of an indemnification statute, i.e., to
enumerate some guidelines for permissible indemnification. To what extent
a court will allow a corporation to go beyond the statutory indemnification
provision is not at all clear. Essential Enterprises Corporation v. Dorsey Corpo-
ration,8 decided under Delaware's former non-exclusive provision, may have
raised a warning flag to corporations concerning the extent of permissiveness.
The court specified, "[a] corporation is free to invoke less than all the indemni-
fication power granted it under this particular statute," 86 and left to implica-
tion that the contrary would not necessarily be true when the corporation
went beyond the statutory grant. Most of the statutes patterned after Delaware's
former provision or the MBCA (1960 version) have similar non-exclusivity pro-
visions. However, Nevada explicitly permits only a narrowing of the state's
permissive grant, stating specifically that indemnification is only "[s]ubject to
such limitations, if any, as may be contained in its certificate or articles of
incorporation, or any amendment thereof.. ... 87
The language of these non-exclusivity provisions may require the corporation
to act at its peril in guessing at the outer limit of the statutes' permissiveness
and to risk being held to have abused its discretion by providing indemni-
fication without some supervision. As some statutes became more comprehen-
sive, such discretion was generally removed from the corporation. For instance,
South Carolina renders invalid any provision which purports to "extend or
limit" the rights and remedies under the statute.8 8 Arkansas also has an exclu-
sive provision to the extent that "[n]o provision of the articles of incorporation
or by-laws for the indemnification of officers [and directors?] in respect to
costs incurred . . . shall be valid unless consistent with the provisions of this
83. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 145(f) (CT Corp. ed. 1967).
84. MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 4(o) (1960).
85. Supra note 44.
86. Id. at 352, 182 A.2d at 653. Accord, Teren v. Howard, 322 F.2d 949 (9th Cir.
1963); SEC v. Continental Growth Fund, 64-66 CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 1 91,437 at
94,719 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 17, 1964).
87. NEV. REV. STAT. § 78.070 (1967).
88. S.C. CODE ANN. § 12-18.18(d) (Supp. 1967).
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Section .. ". . 89 Similarly California, New York and Tennessee incorporate
exclusivity provisions within their statutes. 90
Although these exclusive statutes seek to limit the corporation to the
indemnification provisions enacted by the legislatures, still it is possible that
a court may find other theories upon which to indemnify directors or officers.
In Cohn v. Lionel Corporation9l the New York Court of Appeals held that
an officer-director, who was liable for over $630,000 as a result of his personal
guarantee that 30,500 shares exchanged by his corporation would be worth at
least $800,000, had stated a cause of action for indemnification. Although
New York has an exclusive indemnification provision, the court ruled that
indemnification could result from his agency because he "unequivocally as-
sert[ed] that he executed the guarantee agreement as a agent for Lionel." 92
G. The Board's Role in Awarding Indemnification
Allowing indemnification for settlement payments necessitates some procedure
for determining whether a director or officer is entitled to indemnification.
The new Delaware provision requires that such a determination be made "by
the board of directors by a majority vote of a quorum consisting of directors
who were not parties to such action, suit or proceeding" or "if such a quorum
is not obtainable, or, even if obtainable a quorum of disinterested directors so
directs, by independent legal counsel in a written opinion" or "by the stock-
holders." 93
New Jersey also allows indemnification in settlement situations only when
the board of directors has determined that the director or officer had not
been derelict in his duties.94 But both the New Jersey and new Delaware pro-
visions raise an interesting problem; they impose no legal standard such as
"good faith" upon the board, although it is likely a court would imply this
or else it could be supplied in the certificate of incorporation or bylaws. Ari-
zona imposes by statute such a standard upon boards of directors.9 5 New
Jersey further requires merely that the defendant director or officer had not
been derelict in any "substantial" way. Since it may be too much to expect that
a board of directors can act in the same manner as an adjudicative court, the
lack of rigid standards on the board of directors may cause an abuse of in-
89. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 64-309 (1966).
90. CAL. CORP. CODE ANN. § 830(e) (Supp. 1967); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 721
(McKinney 1963); Tenn. Reg. Sess. H.B. 551, § 306 [1968] (CCH TENN. ADVANCE
S-ss. L. REP. 428-29) (effective July 1, 1969).
91. 21 N.Y.2d 559, 236 N.E.2d 634, 289 N.Y.S.2d 404 (1968).
92. Id. at 562, 236 N.E.2d at 636-37, 289 N.Y.S.2d at 408.
93. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 145(d) (CT Corp. ed. 1967).
94. N.J. REV. STAT. § 14:3-14 (Supp. 1967).
95. ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 10-198(B) (Supp. 1967).
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demnification awards unless the corporation itself provides stricter standards.
New Jersey, in contrast with Delaware, does not specify who on the board is
to make the determination; conceivably, the very director or directors who
are parties defendant may be able to make or assist in making the determina-
tion of their own liability. This is certainly not the most impartial forum, and
even if the certificate of incorporation or bylaws did not exclude the defendant
director(s) from taking part in the determination, a court would probably do
so on public policy grounds. Although New Jersey has excluded indemnifica-
tion for amounts paid when a derivative action has been settled, amounts paid
in settlement of third party actions are included, and there is a possibility that
a director interested in the outcome might be able to make the determination
of liability and defeat the policy behind the statute where his dealings with
outsiders had been wanton, reckless, and in no sense in good faith or in the
reasonable belief that he was furthering the corporation's interest. Arizona's
statute shares the same infirmity of New Jersey's provision in this regard.
Massachusetts' statute, which is a model of ambiguity, allows indemnifica-
tion for directors and officers elected by the stockholders where such indemni-
fication is provided for in the articles of organization, bylaws or by a majority
vote of the shareholders. Concerning officers who are elected by the directors
but who are not directors, as well as employees and other agents, the board
of directors is authorized to grant indemnification except where the defendant
had not acted in good faith and in a reasonable belief that his actions were
in the best interests of the corporation. 96 It would appear that the board of
directors has a maximum amount of discretion under this statute and is account-
able to neither court nor shareholders.
Kentucky and Missouri allow indemnification for amounts paid in settle-
ment provided that the board of directors "shall have first approved such
proposed compromise settlement and determined that the director or officer
involved was not guilty of actual negligence or misconduct . . . -97 Both
statutes share the deficiency of those of New Jersey and Arizona by failing to
expressly limit to disinterested directors the composition of the board of di-
rectors making the determination. But Missouri's provision goes a step further
and allows the board of directors to rely conclusively upon an opinion of
independent legal counsel selected by such board and any such compromise
settlement is not "effective until submitted to and approved by a court of
competent jurisdiction."98 Missouri at least furnishes a guide for the board
of directors to follow in making its determination, although in reality it may
be difficult for counsel to be truly "independent" when selected by the board.
96. MASs. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 1&6B, § 67 (Supp. 1968).
97. Ky. REV. STAT. §271.375(2)' (1963); see also Mo. ANN. STAT. § 351.355(1)
(1966).
98. Mo. ANN. STAT. § 351.355(2) (1966).
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This is especially so if the counsel is a regular associate or friend of the de-
fendant director or officer since he is probably sympathetic to the problems
of the corporation and its management, and perhaps hesitant to impose
stringent standards on people who are responsible for his retainer. The same
problem of "independent" counsel is present in the new Delaware statute. Yet
the Missouri provision makes the indemnification award contingent upon court
approval, which should keep the directors and independent counsel within the
bounds anticipated by the statute.
North Carolina's provision, pertaining only to third party actions, allows
indemnification "as the board of directors in good faith shall deem reason-
able" where the director or officer is successful otherwise than solely on the
merits. If the director or officer is not wholly successful or is unsuccessful in
his defense, he may still be indemnified, in whole or in part, for the expense
of defense and "the amount of any judgment, money decree, fine, penalty or
settlement . . . if a plan for such payment is sent to the holders of all shares
entitled to vote, with notice of shareholders' meeting . . . to be held to take
action thereon . . . exclusive of the shares held directly or indirectly by any
directors or officers to be benefited by the plan if approved." 99 North Carolina
thus provides machinery, however cumbersome it may prove to be in other than
closely held corporations, to notify shareholders, exclusive of the "interested"
or "benefited" parties, and have them approve an indemnification plan. Ohio
allows a determination of negligence or misconduct to be made by a quorum
of the board of directors excluding any director defendants, but if such a
quorum is not obtainable, then a determination can be made in accordance
with "a method established by the articles, the regulations, such agreement, or
such resolution [of the shareholders]." 100 This provision is obviously quite
liberal with respect to the alternatives available when a quorum of disinterested
directors is unavailable, and the end result in such a situation would be to
relegate the decision making machinery to the whims of the corporation without
any direct judicial supervision.
Georgia permits indemnification by a majority vote of the disinterested
directors constituting a quorum, by independent counsel, or by a majority vote
of the stockholders where the director or officer is not successful on the merits
or otherwise.10 1 Montana formerly provided that a quorum of the board of direc-
tors, excluding interested directors, must first approve any compromise settle-
ment and make a determination of the defendant's negligence or misconduct. If
such a quorum is not obtainable, then the determination is made by a majority
of disinterested board members or by three disinterested stockholders appointed
99. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-20(3) (1965).
100. OHio REV. CODE ANN. § 1701.13(E) (2) (Page Supp. 1967).
101. GA. CoDEANN. § 22-717(d) (Supp. 1968) (effective April 1, 1969).
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by the stockholders at a meeting. The Montana provision also allowed the
board of directors to "conclusively" rely upon the opinion of independent legal
counsel.10 2 New York permits a corporation to make indemnification upon a
finding by the board of directors that the director or officer has met the statu-
tory standards or upon the opinion "in writing" of independent legal counsel
that indemnification is proper, or by the shareholders.10 3 Tennessee allows
indemnification by a quorum of disinterested directors to an official not wholly
successful on the merits, or, if such a quorum is not obtainable "with due
diligence," then by the board upon the opinion in writing of independent legal
counsel or by the shareholders. 104
H. The Court's Role in Awarding Indemnification
Another way statutes have provided indemnification, especially in a settlement
situation, is through use of the courts. As explained above, the new Delaware
statute allows a court to indemnify a director or officer for expenses incurred
in a derivative suit, although he may have been found liable for negligence or
misconduct, if the court feels he equitably merits such indemnification. There
was no provision for such a judicial award in the former Delaware statute.
Connecticut and Georgia have similar equitable provisions in their statutes. 10 5
Such a provision, as indicated above, will probably allow a director or officer
to be indemnified in a situation where his conduct is held to constitute a breach
of duty for the first time in a particular jurisdiction.
Judicial supervision of indemnification assures, to some degree, that awards
will not be arbitrarily allowed, for an impartial court is not likely to stray from
the statutory standards. In recognition of this fact, a number of states have
indemnification provisions utilizing, in varying degrees, their courts. Texas
allows a court to assess indemnity against a corporation which has not fully
indemnified a director or officer for the amount that the court "shall deem
reasonable and equitable ... only if the court finds that the person indemnified
was not guilty of negligence or misconduct .... "106 The Texas provision thus
prevents the director or officer from being short-changed by the corporation's
insufficient award, but only to the extent the court feels is proper under the
particular facts. Missouri requires that a compromise settlement first approved
by the board of directors be submitted to a court of competent jurisdiction
102. Ch. 84, § 1, 1943 Mont. Laws (repealed 1967).
103. N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 724 (McKinney 1963).
104. Tenn. Reg. Sess. H.B. 551, § 3.09(2) (b) [1968] (CCH TENN. ADVANCE SESS.
L. REP. 432) (effective July 1, 1969).
105. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 33-320 (c) (2) (Supp. 1968); GA. CODE ANN.
§ 22-717(b) (Supp. 1968) (effective April 1, 1969).
106. TEx. REV. CIvIL STAT. ANN. art. 1396-2.22B (1962).
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and approved by it before such settlement is effective.10 7 Maryland provides
that "a claim of right to or grant of indemnification . . . may, but need not,
be asserted or submitted for adjudication by the corporation or by the person
claiming indemnification" in a court which shall "[a]fter notice and, if re-
quested, a hearing . . . pass a decree either dismissing the proceeding or fixing
the amount to which the person is entitled."' 0 8 South Carolina specifies that
the amount of indemnity be "fixed by order of court." 10 9 The court may permit
or direct reimbursement for expenses, including attorney's fees, if the director
or officer is successful in whole or in part or if the action is settled with court
approval and the court finds the defendant not guilty of negligence or mis-
conduct. The court can also permit or direct indemnification if it finds that
the person "fairly and equitably" merits it, and for any amount paid in dis-
charge of a judgment or settlement approved by the court if it is deemed fair
and equitable. Perhaps in fear that such corporate discretion would be abused,
South Carolina has given discretion to its courts rather than to the corpora-
tions themselves, as is the trend of the newer statutes. While New York's
statute does not permit indemnification for amounts paid in disposing of or
settling a threatened or pending derivative action, it does require court ap-
proval of such settlement in order to indemnify for defense expenses. 110
A few states require some degree of successful defense for judicial award of
indemnification. For example, North Carolina requires some degree of success
in a derivative suit, and then a judge can award indemnification for expenses
of defense which he finds to be reasonable if the director or officer merits the
relief."' California permits a court to determine whether indemnification shall
be made and what amount is reasonable if the director or officer has had some
degree of success in the action and if the court finds that his conduct merits
such indemnity." 2 However, another subdivision of the California statute al-
lows the board of directors in a third party suit to pay expenses, judgments
or fines upon a determination that the director or officer was acting in good
faith and under the reasonable belief that the act was within the scope of
his employment. 1 3
I. Effect of Indemnification Provisions in Foreign Actions
Some states have anticipated that a corporate director or officer might have
an action brought against him in another state, and although he would be
107. Mo. ANN. STAT. § 351.355(2) (1966).
108. MD. ANN. CODE art. 23, § 64(b) (Supp. 1967).
109. S.C. CODE ANN. § 12-18.18(b) (Supp. 1967).
110. N. Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 722(b)(1) (McKinney 1963).
111. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-21 (1965).
112. CAL. CORP. CODE ANN. § 830(a) (Supp. 1967).
113. Id. at (f).
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entitled to indemnification in the state of incorporation, the laws of the foreign
state do not provide such relief. North Carolina provides that in such a
situation the director or officer may make a motion for indemnification as
though the action had been brought in North Carolina, with notice to the
plaintiff in the prior action as the court approves.1 14 Arkansas has a similar
provision.115 Only six states-Alabama, Idaho, Illinois, New Hampshire,
Oklahoma, and Vermont-have no explicit indemnification provisions, but
this does not mean that relief will necessarily be denied.1 6 It is not clear, how-
ever, whether the North Carolina and Arkansas provisions would be utilized
to supplement the award of a foreign state explicitly providing for indemnifica-
tion but only in more restrictive circumstances. Although the new Delaware
statute makes no explicit provision for such a situation, its non-exclusivity
provision would appear to give the corporation discretion to make just such
an award.
J. Notice
Some states have also provided that notice be given to the corporate shareholders
or other interested parties after an assertion of a claim for indemnity. No such
provision is present in Delaware's new statute. Tennessee allows a court to
award indemnification where the corporation has failed to do so, requiring,
however, that the application for indemnification be upon "notice to the corpo-
ration." The court may also require that "notice be given at the expense of
the corporation to the shareholders or members and such other persons as it
may designate .... 1117 In Maryland, where a court can award indemnification,
the statute specifies that after assertion of a claim but before the court awards
indemnity, notice must be given to the parties in interest and a hearing held,
if requested.11 8 Notice further assures that indemnification will not be in-
discriminately awarded after a corporation has refused or failed to do so, or,
as in the case of Maryland, where indemnification may be sought through
the courts.
K. Advance Indemnification
To alleviate any financial hardship upon the director or officer who must
initially pay the defense expenses, the new Delaware-type statute allows an ad-
vance of indemnification in civil and criminal actions for expenses incurred in
preparation for defense of the suit. Virginia, however, disallows advance in-
114. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-21(b) (1965).
115. ARK. STAT. ANN. §64-309(c) (1966).
116. See, e.g., Solimine v. Hollander, 129 N.J. Eq. 264, 19 A.2d 344 (1941).
117. Tenn. Reg. Sess. H.B. 551, § 3.10(2) [1968] (CCH TENN. ADVANCE SEss. L.
REP. 433) (effective July 1, 1969).
118. Mv. ANN. CODE art. 23, § 64(b) (Supp. 1967).
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demnification in criminal actions, but allows the corporation to make other or
"further" indemnification even in criminal proceedings, except where the
defendant has been grossly negligent or guilty of wilful misconduct.1 19 In the
absence of the corporation's further indemnification of such person either
through the articles or bylaws, the director or officer will have to bear the
burden of litigation expenses until he is exonerated.
New York and Tennessee also allow an advance of indemnification for de-
fense expenses in civil and criminal actions. 120 These provisions seem wise and
practical in that they not only place the costs of litigation upon the corporation,
which is better able to bear them, but also relieve the director or officer of
financial worry during the pendency of the litigation. In the event that such
director or officer is ultimately found not entitled to indemnification, Delaware,
New York and Tennessee require that such advance indemnification be
repaid. 21
L. Insurance
Perhaps the most controversial area of indemnification involves insurance. The
recent statutes give the corporation "power to purchase and maintain insurance
• ..whether or not the corporation would have the power to indemnify him
against such liability."'122 California recently amended its statute and now
allows a corporation to carry indemnity insurance and pay the premium "in
whole or part."12 3 Ohio specifies that statutorily allowable recovery is not
exclusive of any other rights under "any insurance purchased by the corpo-
ration." 124 Georgia also allows a corporation to purchase and maintain in-
surance.
125
The recent trend toward allowing corporations to carry insurance and pay
the premiums raises some serious questions,126 although this practice has met
with corporate approval. 127 A leading company in the field of such insurance
119. VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-3.1(f) (Supp. 1968).
120. N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 724(c) (McKinney 1963); Tenn. Reg. Sess. H.B. 551,
§§ 3.09(3), 3.11(1) [1968] (CCH TENN. ADVANCE SESs. L. REP. 432, 434) (effective
July 1, 1969).
121. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 145(e) (CT Corp. ed. 1967); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW
§ 726(a) (McKinney 1963); Tenn. Reg. Sess. H.B. 551, § 3.11(1) [1968] (CCH TENN.
ADVANCE SESS. L. REP. 434) (effective July 1, 1969).
122. E.g.,DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 145(g) (CT Corp. ed. 1967).
123. CAL. CORP. CODE ANN. § 830(h), as amended, ch. 400, Cal. Laws S.B. 824
[1968] (applicable to premiums whenever paid).
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[M]any giant companies and their executives are hustling to take out insurance.
General Motors Corp. and its executives recently purchased $25 million in
coverage in what is said to be the biggest executive insurance deal on record.
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is Stewart, Smith & Co., whose coverage plan is composed of two separate
policies. One such policy pays, on behalf of the corporation, amounts which
the corporation may be required to pay or permitted to pay to its directors
or officers. The other policy permits a director or officer to recover directly
from the insurer in situations where the director or officer cannot be indemni-
fied by the corporation, but such recovery from the insurance company is
denied the director or officer where, for example, there is intentional dis-
honesty or the director or officer has personally profited illegally.
Two basic questions arise as to the propriety of allowing indemnification
insurance. One concerns the negation by such insurance of the deterrent effect
of civil or criminal liability upon the actions of corporate officials. Where the
director or officer is guilty of misfeasance, civil liability in the form of a judg-
ment should be imposed to deter such actions. If the director or officer can
then avoid the financial consequence of such acts through insurance, corporate
officials can embark with impunity upon a course of self-enriching acts. Cali-
fornia's statute, which requires a judicial determination of whether indemnifica-
tion shall be made, appears to be rendered meaningless by a new provision
which states that "[n]othing in this section shall prohibit a corporation
from paying, in whole or part, the premium or other charge for any type of
indemnity insurance ... against liability or loss arising out of his actual or
asserted misfeasance or nonfeasance in the performance of his duties or out of
any actual or asserted wrongful act against, or by, any of such corpora-
tions including, but not limited to, judgments, fines, settlements, and ex-
penses ... "128
The other question raised by the insurance provisions concerns the burden
of premium costs. California specifically allows the corporation to pay in
whole or in part. If a statute prohibits indemnification of a director or officer
under certain circumstances, a corporation which pays premiums for insurance
of its officials can still indirectly indemnify the officials and thus defeat the
policy of any indemnification provision. The generally accepted division of
premium costs is ninety percent paid by the corporation and ten percent paid
by the directors and officers as a group. Some corporations, however, take
the view that such insurance is not only a business expense but also too novel
The coverage costs about $450,000 for a three-year period, and GM says its
executives pick up part of the tab. . . . [T]he companies that have the most
trouble buying policies are in industries that are prime targets for antitrust
proceedings, such as steel. ...
Other companies that sometimes have trouble buying policies include firms
whose sales are tied closely to Government contracts. . . .Firms having trouble
with their creditors or facing big proxy fights are often turned down, in-
surance men say.
128. CAL. CORP. CODE ANN. § 830(h), as amended, ch. 400, Cal. Laws S.B. 824
[1968] (applicable to premiums whenever paid).
Corporate indemnification
for an accurate allocation; these corporations thus bear the entire cost on
their own.
It is possible that indemnity by insurance will be denied in a situation where
the director or officer collects under a policy wholly paid for by the corpora-
tion for acts which could not be indemnified by the corporation. When the
director or officer is guilty of misfeasance which in no- way benefited the corpo-
ration and he did not pay for any part of the insurance premium, it is con-
ceivable that a derivative action could be instituted to have the director or
officer contribute his fair share to the premium payment. There is also the
possibility in the situation posited that an insurance company would refuse to
pay, if faced with a sizable loss, on the ground that such insurance contravenes
public policy. It is also arguable on public policy grounds that even the director
or officer himself should not be allowed to buy insurance against liability arising
from breach of duty for which the corporation could not indemnify him under
the state statute. However, experience with such insurance is still minimal, and
such questions will have to be answered when these specific controversies arise.
Conclusion
Delaware's new statute and the one patterned thereafter have come a long way
from the previous Delaware statute. From a basic statute with broad language
has emerged a form of statute which tries to anticipate troublespots, and, at
the same time, gives the corporation maximum discretion in the award of
indemnification. It has clearly distinguished between third party and derivative
actions and has acknowledged that different standards are applicable in those
two situations. Employees and agents are included within its coverage, in
addition to directors and officers, and it explicitly applies to civil, criminal,
administrative and investigative proceedings. It also affords the corporate
offical an opportunity to settle third party suits or enter a plea of nolo con-
tendere in a criminal action without risking an unfavorable presumption, by
either act alone, which might defeat his chance for indemnification.
The new statutes also empower a corporation to indemnify for expenses in
connection with settlements of threatened or pending derivative actions, and
it is here that an area of abuse may have been opened up. A defendant-director
or officer will likely settle with the corporation, taking a chance that the
board of directors will determine him to be not guilty of negligence or mis-
conduct in the performance of his duties. It is difficult to see how fellow
directors can form a truly impartial forum even with the opinion of "inde-
pendent" legal counsel. Just how broadly the non-exclusivity provision will be
interpreted by courts is yet to be seen, but courts may be willing to set limits.
The problems that the insurance provision presents have not surfaced at this
time, but some of the obvious difficulties should be anticipated.
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Because of its liberality and attractiveness to corporations and because of
Delaware's influence in the area of corporation law, the new Delaware-type
provision is likely to be adopted by many states. However, the states should
consider the possibility of further improvement. One improvement might be to
exclude explicitly from indemnification certain persons whom judicial interpre-
tation may bring within the coverage of the new Delaware statute. While it may
be desirable to retain within the statutory language corporate personnel who
do not qualify de jure as directors or officers under statute, certificates of in-
corporation or bylaw, but who are in fact corporate officials by virtue of
their powers and responsibilities, the inclusion of minor employees and in-
dependent contractors is questionable.
Judicial supervision of the indemnification award, especially in the settle-
ment of a threatened or pending action, is another area needing improvement.
Providing for judicial review of a board of directors' determination to insure
that the public policy behind an indemnification statute is not violated is
neither unprecedented nor unreasonable. In addition, the statute should re-
quire that notice of a claim for indemnification be given, at least to share-
holders, so that they may be apprised of possible disposition of corporate assets.
Finally, future statutes should make indemnification obtainable for suits
brought in states not having indemnification provisions or not providing for
such awards in all situations covered by the new Delaware-type statute. This
would be more desirable than relying upon the catch-all non-exclusivity
provision.
James F. McKeown
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